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ABSTRACTS OF RECENT CASES
Abstractors
Richard K. Janger* and Alan H. Swanson*
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-Channel v. United
States, 285 F.2d 217 (9th Cir. 1960). Defendant
was convicted of violating federal narcotics laws.
On appeal, he contended that heroin seized in his
room should not have been admitted into evidence
because the police did not have a search warrant
and defendant did not consent to the search while
being questioned by the police at their station.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that a search of a defendant's apartment
without a warrant while defendant is still in
custody can be lawful where defendant gives his
unequivocal and specific consent but that where,
as here, defendant, during an interrogation by the
police, said either, 'q have no stuff in my apart-
ment and you are welcome to go search," or "You
can go out and search the place," the police could
not interpret this as an unequivocal and specific
consent, and hence the heroin seized as a result of
the unlawful search should not have been ad-
mitted.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-United States v.
Gaitan, 189 F. Supp. 674 (D. Colo. 1960). In 1958
defendant was convicted of narcotics violations
by a federal court on the basis of evidence which
had been illegally seized by city police officers.
Subsequently, the defendant moved to vacate, set
aside, or correct his sentence under 28 U.S.C.A.
§2255, claiming that in light of Elkins v. United
States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) (where the Supreme
Court held such illegally seized evidence inad-
missible in federal prosecutions), he is entitled to
relief because the exclusion under Elkins was for
the purpose of enforcing rights guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment to the Federal Constitu-
tion. The District Court denied the motion,
holding that in Elkins, the question was one of
admissibility of evidence rather than constitutional
enforcement and thus 28 U.S.C.A. §2255 was not
available to defendant inasmuch as it affords relief
when there is an infringement of constitutional
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rights and not where the question raised is one of
admissibility of evidence.
Arrest, Search, and Seizure-People v. Fagin-
krantz, 171 N.E.2d 5 (I1. 1961). Defendant was
convicted of unlawful possession of burglary tools.
On appeal, he contended that the trial court erred
in denying his motion to suppress as evidence
certain tools found -in his possession inasmuch as
his consent to the search of his car was not a true
consent, but rather a submission to the authority
of police officers. The Supreme Court affirmed,
holding that it was unnecessary to analyze the
quality of defendant's consent because the de-
fendant's unlikely explanation of his presence in
an alley far from his home at 4:30 a.m. and his
inability to produce any indicia of ownership of
the car, coupled with his admitted criminal
record and a history of burglaries in the alley,
gave the police reasonable cause to believe that
defendant was committing a crime and hence the
search of defendant's car was not unreasonable.
Building Inspections-City of St. Louis v.
Evans, 337 S.W.2d 948 (Mo. 1960). Defendants, a
landlord and a janitor, were charged with violating
a city ordinance prohibiting the obstruction of
city inspectors in the discharge of their duties.
From judgments of dismissal, the City of St.
Louis appealed and contended that the trial
court erred in holding that city ordinances pro-
viding for the entry and inspection of buildings
for the purpose of administering ordinances
relating to public health, safety, and welfare were
violative of the Missouri constitutional provisions
against self-incrimination, double jeopardy, and
unreasonable searches and seizures, as well as the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
The Supreme Court, affirming in part and re-
versing in part, held that the Missouri constitu-
tional provisions and the federal due process
clause do not prohibit a city from enacting or-
dinances prescribing regulations for the promotion
of the health and welfare of people, including
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provisions for the reasonable entry and inspection
of buildings.
"Common Thief"-State v. Cherry, 167 A.2d
328 (Md. 1961). Defendant was indicted for being
a "common thief" but the trial court granted his
motion to quash the indictment on the ground
that the statute imposing a duty on police offi-
cials to arrest all persons whom "they shall know
or have good reason to believe are common
thieves" violated both the federal and state due
process clauses, inasmuch as the statute failed to
set out any positive guides or definite standards
for determining the guilt of a person charged with
being a "common thief." On appeal, the State
contended that the statute was not so vague and
indefinite as to run afoul of the state and federal
due process clauses. The Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded, holding that although the
statute did not define "common thief," the term
nevertheless had a sufficiently technical and well
established meaning in law (i.e., a person who is
"habitually and by practice" a thief) so that in
conjunction with the remainder of the statute, the
term fixed an ascertainable standard of guilt
sufficiently definite to satisfy the requirements of
due process.
Conspiracy-United States v. Bufalino, 285
F.2d 408 (2d Cir. 1960). Defendants were convicted
of conspiring to commit perjury and obstruct
justice by giving false and evasive statements
before federal grand juries. On appeal, they
contended that the evidence was insufficient to
prove any conspiracy among the defendants to lie
about their purpose in gathering at Apalachin, New
York. The Court of Appeals reversed the con-
victions, holding that although the government's
evidence may have justified a finding that at
least some of the defendants lied as to their
purpose for meeting, it did not support a finding
that the defendants agreed to lie, nor did the
government prove that defendants knew or
should have known at the date they met that
they would be asked to testify as to the subject
matter of their Apalachin meeting.
Contraceptives-Trubeck v. Ullman, 165 A.2d
158 (Conn. 1960). Plaintiffs brought an action for
a declaratory judgment to determine the con-
stitutionality of Connecticut statutes prohibiting
the use of contraceptives, and the counseling or
abetting of such use. A demurrer to the complaint
was sustained, whereupon plaintiffs appealed. The
Supreme Court of Errors found no error and held
that such statutes are valid as a proper exercise
of the police power and do not invade rights
guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment to the
Federal Constitution.
Disorderly Conduct-Drews v. State, 167 A.2d
341 (Md. 1961). Defendants, two white men, a
white woman and a Negro woman, were convicted
of violating a disorderly conduct statute by
disturbing the peace in a place of public amuse-
ment. On appeal, they contended that since the
privately owned amusement park would not admit
Negroes it therefore could not be regarded as a
"place of public resort or amusement" within the
meaning of the Maryland disorderly conduct
statute. The Court of Appeals affirmed, holding
that a privately owned amusement park is a
"place of public resort or amusement" under the
statute and the regular exclusion of Negroes did
not keep the park from coming within the terms
of the statute.
Double Jeopardy---Crawford v. United States,
285 F.2d 661 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Defendant was
convicted of operating a lottery (a felony) and
knowingly possessing lottery slips (a misde-
meanor). On appeal, he contended that the trial
court erred when, after determining that certain
jurors had voted on the misdemeanor but not on
the felony charge, it set aside the entire verdict,
ordered a new trial, and refused to accept de-
fendant's plea of former jeopardy. The Court of
Appeals affirmed, holding that defendant's right
to be free from jeopardy after a jury renders its
verdict is not absolute and that the trial court had
discretion to refrain from sentencing on the verdict
as rendered and, instead, to set aside the entire
verdict and order a new trial where, as here, the
jury exhibited a considerable degree of confusion
as to what it had done and could not be reas-
sembled.
Double Jeopardy-Commonwealth v. Taylor,
165 A.2d 134 (Pa. 1960). Defendant was convicted
on three counts, the first charging assault on one
DiCicco with intent to rob, the second charging
aggravated assault and battery on DiCicco and
assault with intent to murder, and the third
charging aggravated assault and battery on Di-
[Vol. 52
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Cicco's wife. On appeal, defendant contended
that the trial court erred in imposing three separate
sentences on the three counts because all three
counts allegedly involved the same crime arising
out of one transaction. The Superior Court dis-
missed the appeal, holding that the test of whether
one criminal offense has merged into another is
whether one crime necessarily involves the other
and not whether the two criminal acts are succes-
sive steps in the same transaction, and therefore
where defendant, armed with a revolver, entered a
business establishment, announced that there
was a holdup, and shot DiCicco and DiCicco's
wife, defendant was properly charged with three
separate crimes.
Felony Murder-Commonwealth v. De Moss,
165 A.2d 14 (Pa. 1960). Defendant was convicted
of first degree murder. On appeal, he contended
that the only evidence connecting him with the
robbery and homicide of an elderly widow was
that he had been in association, prior to and sub-
sequent to the happening of the robbery and
homicide, with the persons who actually par-
ticipated in both crimes. The Supreme Court
affirmed, holding that even though defendant did
not take part in the actual robbery and killing,
the evidence nevertheless showed that he was an
active participant in the conspiracy to rob, and
this was sufficient to convict him of first degree
murder since co-conspirators are all liable for a
killing which takes place in the course of a robbery
even though the death of the victim was not
planned. One judge dissented.
Fingerprinting-United States v. Krapf, 285
F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1961). Defendant, on a plea of
guilty, was convicted of the misdemeanor of know-
ingly and wilfully violating I.C.C. regulations
dealing generally with brake, systems required on
truck-tractors moving in interstate commerce. At
the close of the sentenceing proceeding in which
he was awarded probation, defendant refused to
be fingerprinted by the United States Marshal,
whereupon the district court ordered the de-
fendant to submit to such fingerprinting. On
appeal, defendant contended that the Marshal's
right to fingerprint is derived solely from 28
U.S.C.A. §549 which limits the Marshal's power
to that possessed by a sheriff in the state where
the Marshal is located (New Jersey) and that
New Jersey did not consider defendant's crime of
such a nature as to warrant fingerprinting. The
Court of Appeals, affirming the order to finger-
print defendant, held that the Marshal's power to
fingerprint is derived from the power to discharge
duties imposed upon him by the Attorney General,
as well as 28 U.S.C.A. §549, and that since finger-
printing is not a punishment but a means of
facilitating identification and enforcement of
federal law, there is no reason to distinguish in
this connection between federal crimes which are
merely mala prohibita and those which are mala
in se.
Illegal Detention--Tate v. United States, 283
F.2d 35 (D.C. Cir. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of entering a hospital and stealing property.
On appeal, defendant contended that the trial
court erred in permitting the prosecution, on
rebuttal, to submit statements alleged to have been
made by defendant to the police during an un-
necessary delay between his arrest and the pre-
liminary hearing. The Court of Appeals affirmed
the conviction, holding that where the defendant
takes the stand to testify, the McNabb-Mallory
doctrine does not require the exclusion of prior
contradictory statements made during a period of
alleged illegal detention when such statements are
introduced for impeachment purposes only.
Insanity-United States v. Amburgey, 189 F.
Supp. 687 (D.D.C. 1960). After being convicted
of forgery, defendant moved for either acquittal
by reason of insanity or a new trial. He contended
that since on trial he had produced some evidence
of mental illness, the government had the burden
of proving beyond a reasonable doubt his sanity
at the time of the crime. The District Court, in
ordering a new trial, reversed its own ruling made
during the trial that, in order to put the burden
of proving sanity on the prosecution, the defendant
must not only produce (1) "some evidence" of
mental illness but also (2) "some evidence" that
the crime was the product of the alleged mental
illness. The Court concluded instead that, under
the Durham rule, the defendant, in order to raise
the defense of insanity, need only produce evidence
of mental illness and that, for purposes of shifting
the burden to the prosecution, it will then be
presumed that the crime was the product of the
alleged mental illness. The Court's opinion also
includes a detailed, annotated discussion of the
1961]
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respective functions of the expert medical witness
and the trier of facts under the Durham rule.
Involuntary Manslaughter-Palmer v. State,
164 A.2d 467 (Md. 1960). Defendant was con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter. On appeal,
she contended that her conduct in allowing her
paramour to inflict upon her 20-month-old child
a number of beatings which finally resulted in the
child's death did not constitute gross, or criminal,
negligence, and that her negligence, if any, was
not a proximate cause of the death. The Court
of Appeals affirmed, holding that defendant
was guilty of gross or criminal negligence in
permitting the prolonged and brutal beatings of
her child, and that her failure to remove the infant
from the peril supported the lower court's finding
that her negligence was a proximate cause of the
child's death.
Involuntary Manslaughter-People v. Marshall,
106 N.W.2d 842 (Mich. 1961). Defendant, who
had permitted a drunk to drive his (defendant's)
automobile, was convicted of the involuntary
manslaughter of a person who was killed in an
auto accident caused by the drunk while driving
defendant's car. On appeal, defendant contended
that he could not be found guilty of involuntary
manslaughter on these facts especially since he was
at home in bed at the time of the accident. The
Supreme Court set aside the verdict of involuntary
manslaughter but held that defendant was properly
convicted of the misdemeanor of knowingly per-
mitting one's car to be driven by a person who is
under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Involuntary Manslaughter-State v. Sealy, 117
S.E.2d 793 (N.C. 1961). Defendants were con-
victed of involuntary manslaughter based on an
automobile collision. On appeal, defendants
claimed that the trial court erred when it instructed
the jury that they could find defendants guilty if
they found that defendants violated the statute
relating to stopping at stop signs, and that such
violation was the proximate cause of the deaths.
The Supreme Court ordered a new trial, holding
that the instruction was erroneous because unin-
tentional violation of the statute, by itself, would
not constitute culpable negligence and that the
jury must also find that defendants acted with a
thoughtless disregard of consequences or with a
heedless indifference to the safety of others.
Juries-Holmes v. United States, 284 F.2d 716
(4th Cir. 1960). Defendents, Holmes and Bedami,
convicted of interstate transportation of stolen
automobiles, moved for a new trial, but it was
denied. On appeal, defendants contended that the
trial court erred in not granting a new trial because
the deputy marshal had improperly communicated
prejudicial information to the jury. The Court of
Appeals reversed and remanded, holding that
where the deputy marshal, when asked by a juror
where the defendants were staying, said that
Bedami was serving a six year jail sentence, it was
clear that the deputy marshal improperly informed
the jury of a prior conviction of one of the defend-
ants, and where a finding of guilty was so depend-
ent upon the connection between the two defend-
ants, collateral information dearly prejudicial to
Bedami was also harmful to Holmes.
Public Trial-Rynwlds v. State, 126 So.2d 497
(Ala. 1961). Defendant was convicted of indecent
molestation of a child under the age of sixteen.
On appeal, defendant contended that he was
deprived of his constitutional right to a public
trial when the trial judge excluded from the
courtroom all children under the age of eighteen.
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded,
holding that the trial judge's order of exclusion
went beyond the dictum of a previous Alabama
decision which stated that children of "tender
years" could be excluded and therefore operated
to deprive defendant of his constitutional right
to a public trial.
Right to Counsel-McNel av. Culver, 81 Sup.
Ct. 413 (1961). After being convicted of assault
to murder in the second degree by a Florida state
court, defendant filed a petition for a writ of
habeas corpus with the Florida Supreme Court,
but it was denied without a hearing. On certiorari,
defendant claimed that he was denied due process
under the fourteenth amendment to the Federal
Constitution by virtue of the Florida Supreme
Court's refusal to permit him a full hearing and the
trial court's refusal to appoint counsel. The
Supreme Court held that where the record showed
defendant's ignorance, indigence, mental illness,
and complete unfamiliarity with law and court
procedures, plus the trial judge's scant assistance,
the state court was obliged to grant a hearing and
if the alleged facts were true, trial court's denial
of counsel constituted a denial of due process.
[V'ol. 52
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Sentences--Caanan v. United States, 81 Sup.
Ct. 321 (1961). Defendant was convicted of ob-
structing commerce by extortion as well as con-
spiracy to perpetrate the substantive offense.
He was sentenced to consecutive terms of twelve
years for the conspiracy and five years of probation
for the substantive offense. After his motion to
correct his sentence was denied, defendant, on
certiorari, claimed that the trial court erred in
sentencing him to consecidive terms because
Congress, by including the conspiracy and the
substantive offense in one provision of the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C.A. §1951, intended that only con-
current terms should be given. The Supreme Court
affirmed the denial of the motion, holding that
the trial judge has discretion in fixing consecutive
terms for violation of the Hobbs Act inasmuch as
the Act authorizes separate punishments for the
conviction of separate offenses. Chief Justice
Warren and Justices Stewart, Black, and Douglas
dissented.
Sentences-Smith v. United Stales, 284 F.2d
789 (5th Cir. 1960). Defendants were convicted of
postal robbery and, in accordance with statute,
given a 25-year mandatory sentence. On appeal,
defendants contended that the statute requiring
a mandatory sentence invaded the the judiciary's
right to exercise independent discretion and thus
violated article III of the Federal Constitution.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction and
upheld the statute, stating that Congress has the
power not only to determine what constitutes a
crime but also to state what punishment will be
given by a court after guilt is found.
Year-and-a-Day Rule-Commonwealth v. Ladd,
166 A.2d 501 (Pa. 1960). Defendant was indicted
for murder and for manslaughter. He moved to
quash the indictments, contending that under the
common law of Pennsylvania he could not be
held since the death of the victim occurred more
than a year and a day after the injury was inflicted.
The lower court overruled the motions, and the
Supreme Court affirmed, holding that the "year-
and-a-day" rule, which it termed a mere rule of
evidence or procedure, should no longer be rec-
ognized inasmuch as "modern conditions have
moved beyond it" and "left it sterile." Two judges
dissented.
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